High court to review sentence in plea bargain conundrum

Julie Gardiner  no longer faces the prospect of spending the next 20 years in prison instead of likely being free on a suspended sentence due to a standard, but inadequate plea bargain and a rigid sentencing scheme. In a case-of-first-impression decision issued on April 30, 2010, the Indiana Supreme Court determined that due to its subsequent modification, Gardiner no longer has a prior unrelated felony conviction mandating imposition of the lengthy prison sentence.

Gardiner’s problem was this: On March 2, 2007, she plead guilty to manufacturing methamphetamine [ the actual charge was "possession  of chemical precursors with intent to manufacture controlled substances"] in Hamilton County, a Class D felony. By agreement, the felony charge was converted to a misdemeanor in February 2008 after she successfully completed a year of probation. But at the time of the plea, Gardiner’s lawyer failed to adequately consider the effect of another pending felony charge against her in Marion County for selling methamphetamine  within 1,000 feet of a school.

Gardiner was convicted of the second charge prior to the conversion of her initial plea to a misdemeanor. As a result, she was found to be convicted of two felonies, resulting in the minimum 20 year sentence. Her sentence was affirmed on appeal, even though both the trial and the appellate court judges noted her good behavior and expressed dismay over the sentence. In its opinion, the appellate court stated that “had the Hamilton County court immediately reduced Gardiner’s prior Class D felony to a Class A misdemeanor, then the [Marion County] trial court would have had the discretion to order a suspended sentence” in the second case. Gardiner v. State, 903 N.E.2d 552, 555 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Furthermore, the appellate court expressed its frustration in a “sentencing scheme that so illogically limits the sentencing judge’s discretion” to reward a defendant’s good behavior. Id. at 556. The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and heard oral argument early in October.

In its April 30 decision, the high court found that “the entry of judgment of conviction upon the misdemeanor constitutes a new and different judgment effectively vacating the prior judgment.”  It concluded that as a matter of statutory construction “Gardiner no longer has a prior unrelated felony conviction” and remanded the case to the trial court for further consideration.

Induced confession / incest

Anderson Police Detective Cole gave Larry L. McGhee some misleading advice as he was investigating a criminal incest allegation. McGhee first denied having sex with his 25-year-old niece, and then the following exchange took place:

Cole: What I do know is, that we’re starting, me and you, man to man talking about this, I’m telling you right now, if you had sex with her and she wanted it and it’s embarrassing sometimes for an uncle to have sex with his niece, but it’s not against the law if she wanted it.

McGhee: Right.

Cole: That’s why I’m asking you now, I want you to clear your name.

McGhee: Right.

McGhee v. State, 899 N.E.2d 35, 37 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)

McGhee proceeded to confess, and that confession was used by prosecutors in obtaining a conviction against him. On appeal, the conviction was overturned based on the police investigator’s misrepresentation that sex between an uncle and his niece was not a crime. While the appellate court recognized the detective’s assertion that he did not know at the time that sex between an uncle and a niece would be illegal, the court still found that McGhee’s resulting confession should not have been admitted into evidence at trial.

The court noted the state relied upon Clark v. State, 808 N.E.2d 1183, 1191-92 (Ind. 2004), where the high court held that “if the police have a good faith basis for a statement, even if technically false, it does not rise to the level of deception.”

But even without any showing falsity, the appellate court rejected the state’s argument. “We would set a dangerous precedent if we were to hold that a lack of knowledge of the law amounts to a good faith basis for a material misstatement. Such a holding would give police officers an incentive to not know the law,” the appellate court held, concluding that McGhee’s confession was involuntary. McGhee, 899 N.E.2d at 37.

In a 3-2 decision, with Justices Shepard and Sullivan in the minority, the Indiana Supreme Court declined to accept the case on transfer, leaving the appeals court’s decision intact.

For McGhee, however, the victory was less than complete. The appellate court remanded the case, finding that given the strength of the evidence against him, re-trial would not violate the constitutional bar on double jeopardy.

Evidence of prior rape

Otho L. Lafayette was found guilty of rape in a jury trial where the court allowed testimony concerning a rape he previously committed. A divided Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. The Supreme Court has granted a petition to transfer the case, thus automatically vacating the appellate court’s decision, and has assumed jurisdiction over the appeal.

Vacated ruling below:

Lafayette v. State, 899 N.E.2d 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).